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REVIVAL OF WELFARE REFORM*
SEUNG JA DOE, M.Sc.Econ.,MSW+
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
ABSTRACT
It is a well known fact that
poverty is prevalent among single
mothers and children. Currently,
the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) program fails to
provide for all children and single
mothers in need of public
assistance. Previous attempts to
"reform" the welfare system have
been unsuccessful. However, in the
time when the poor's right for
social welfare is increasingly
threatened, ideas for welfare
reform need to be revived. The
author advocates for a three-
dimensional agenda for welfare
reform: universal assistance to
families with children, reinforced
support for children with absent
parents, and targeted employment
programs for single mothers.
* An earlier version of this paper was
presented at the 85th Annual Conference of
the Missouri Association for Social Welfare,
Columbia, Missouri, October 23-25, 1985.
+ The author is a Ph. D. candidate at the
Washington University in St. Louis.
Recent statistics show that a
significant proportion of children live with
one parent only. According to the March 1984
Current Population Survey, 26 percent of all
families with children under 18 were
maintained by one parent (U.S. Department of
Commerce (a), 1985:1). In 1984, the
proportion of children living with one parent
was more than 50 percent for blacks and
nearly 20 percent for whites. In the same
year, about 90 percent of all children in
one-parent families lived with their mothers
only (U.S. Department of Commerce (b),
1985:18).
One of the most compelling social
welfare issues in recent years is the high
incidence of poverty among women and
children, which is epitomized by families
headed by single mothers. In 1984, families
maintained by women with no husband had a
median income of approximately $13,000
whereas the median income of married-couple
families was approximately $30,000
Consequently, in 1984, 34.5 percent of
female-headed families lived in poverty,
while about 7 percent of married-couple
families fell below the poverty level (U.S.
Department of Commerce (c), 1985:2-3). Since
a considerable proportion of children live
with mothers only, children are more likely
than any other age group to be living in
poverty. For example, in 1983, nearly one
out of four preschool children lived in
poverty (Moynihan, 1985:10). Moreover, it is
projected that more than 60 percent of
preschool children in female-headed families
will be living in poverty in 1990 (U.S. House
of Representatives, 1984:7).
Considering the high incidence of
poverty among female-headed families, it is
not surprising that the welfare receipt rate
among them is also high. In 1978, about 60
percent of all individuals receiving welfare
income lived in families headed by a woman
:(Duncan, et al., 1984:80). A high proportion
of female-headed families also reeived
various means-tested non-cash benefits.
The purpose of this paper is three-fold.
First, the problems with the current Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
program are scrutinized. Second, the past
approaches toward welfare reform are briefly
reviewed. Third, a three-dimensional
approach toward welfare reform is discussed.
:In suggesting alternative income maintenance
policies for children and single-parent
families this paper intends to provide
rationales for bringing about such policy
changes. However, to delineate program costs
for establishing a new welfare system goes
beyond the scope of this paper. Thus, issues
such as tax reform are not discussed. The
goal of this paper is simply to facilitate
further discussion by renewing life in
progressive welfare reform issues.
STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS WITH THE AFDC PROGRAM
Among publicly funded welfare programs,
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) program has played a crucial role in
providing for mainly low income single
mothers and their children. Currently, as
one of the largest income-tested welfare
programs in the United States, the total AFDC
payment amounts to approximately $14.4
billion per year, providing for about 3.7
million families (Ross, 1985:9). Since the
inception of the AFDC program in 1935, many
incremental changes have been made in the
program. Looking back on its 50 year
history, however, it is now time to make a
fundamental advance beyond the limitation in
the current AFDC program to fully achieve its
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ultimate goal of strengthening family life.
There are many problems with the current AFDC
program:
* Poor families with unemployed fathers
are not eligible for AFDC benefits in 25
states. Due to the inequity of the AFDC
program, two-parent families with no other
income do not have access to AFDC benefits,
even if they are in poverty as a result of
unstable employment.
' The disparity of the AFDC program is
found in the payment levels which vary by
states. In the absence of a nationally
uniform benefit level, as of 1982, the amount
of the average AFDC monthly payment provided
by the most generous state was more than six
times the amount paid by the least generous
state (U.S. House of Representatives,
1983:52).
• AFDC benefits are less than adequate
in meeting the need of AFDC recipient
families. The federal government does not
require that states pay the full amount of
the minimum living expense as designated by
each state. As a result, the median maximum
AFDC benefit among states is about half the
poverty standard. The value of AFDC benefits
even when it is combined with food stamps
remains below the poverty level in all states
except Alaska (The Center for the Study of
Social Policy, 1984:15).
I Income-tested welfare programs such as
AFDC have produced an intrinsic dilemma by
creating work disincentive effects. The
dilemma is that welfare recipients' work
incentives are influenced by implicit tax
rates levied on their earnings, that is
benefit reduction rates. Often, welfare
recipients' earnings create a "notch" problem
-- earnings reach a point at which the
eligibility for welfare is terminated and
welfare benefits fall by more than the amount
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of the additional earnings. With high
implicit tax rates which may go over 100
percent, when the loss of in-kind benefits is
considered, "the current system of income
transfers penalizes the poor for working"
(Smeeding and Garfinkel, 1980:43).
The current welfare system fails to
provide for the working poor. In 1980, about
one-half of all poor family heads worked but
were in poverty due to low earnings (Levitan
and Johnson, 1982:53). The economic
"hardship" of the working poor is likely to
be faced most frequently by women,
minorities, and other low income workers
(Taggart, 1982:264). Thus, an income
transfer program such as AFDC which ignores
the need of the working poor cannot be an
efficient program for solving the problem of
poverty, particularly among female-headed
families.
' AFDC recipients are not free from the
stigma of receiving public assistance. The
existence of the stigma of welfare recipiency
is confirmed by stereotyping of welfare
recipients as well as by case studies, survey
data, and other resources (Allen, 1982:48;
Garfinkel, 1982:496-497; Moffitt, 1983:1030-
34). According to a survey study, the degree
of stigma attached to General Relief and AFDC
programs is the greatest, when compared with
other income maintenance programs (as quoted
in Pettigrew, 1980:223).
: The AFDC program is inefficiently
administered duy to its complex procedure of
income-testing. In particular, it should be
noted that an inefficient duplication of
income-testing often takes place in
processing separate applications for AFDC
benefits and Food Stamps, while 80 percent of
AFDC recipients also receive Food Stamps
(General Accounting office, 1984:v).
These problems in the AFDC program are
traced to the structure of the American
welfare system. In 1981, about 45 percent of
federal expenditures was used for the income
transfer system in the United States. About
$300 billion were used for over 40 separate
income maintenance programs, amounting to
about 10 percent of the GNP in 1981.
However, most of the expenditures for income
maintenance were used for social insurance
programs, leaving about $76 billion for
welfare programs (Garfinkel and Haveman,
1983:479-481). Unlike in most industrialized
countries, the United States lacks an
equality-enhancing welfare system which
provides minimum guarantees such as family
allowances or national health services.
Due to the structure of her welfare
system, the United States is not considered
to be a welfare state, nor a social security
state, but a "positive state" aiming
"primarily at insuring economic stability and
thus the self-interest of existing property
holders" (as quoted in Mishra, 1984:156).
The social security state is defined to be
the one aiming at a guaranteed national
minimum income like Britain, and the social
welfare state the one furthering greater
social and economic equality like Sweden.
The United States is, at best, a reluctant
welfare state, because it does not follow the
"principles" of the welfare state: guaranteed
basic economic security, distributive justice
and equality, and most of all, social
solidarity (Esping-Andersen, 1982:36). In the
absence of nationally guaranteed programs,
the American welfare programs have lacked
systematic planning, resulting in a series of
piece-meal measures. Categorical welfare
programs have been incremented in response to
economic distress and social crisis (Piven
and Cloward, 1971: Hareven, 1974:69-70). In
short, the AFDC program is a typical example
of categorical welfare programs with problems
of inequity, disparity, inadequacy, work
disincentive effects, inefficiency, stigma
effects, and complexity.
BILATERAL APPROACHES TOWARD WELFARE REFORM
Policy proposals aiming to correct
problems of welfare programs are broadly
categorized into two groups: an overhaul of
the welfare system and an incremental
improvement of existing programs. In the
past, neither approach toward welfare reform
has been successful. For example, the
Family Allowances Act proposed in 1967 aimed
at an overhaul of the welfare system by
taking an universalistic approach toward
welfare reform. The proposal intended to
cover all children under 18 in all families,
regardless of family income levels or the
family structure. It was to be administered
by the federal government and financed from
general tax revenues (Vadakin, 1968:184-189).
The failure of the proposed Family
Allowances Act led to a compromised welfare
reform proposal which abandoned the coverage
of all children. The Family Assistance Plan
(FAP) proposed in 1969 by President Nixon was
to provide nationally financed income support
to all low income families with children.
The goals of the FAP were 1) to alleviate
poverty among all poor families with
children, 2) to reduce work disincentive
effects of income-tested programs, and 3) to
encourage family stability by providing for
all poor families. However, it was foreseen
that work disincentive effects could not be
reduced because the FAP relied on income-
testing to limit the eligibility to poor
families. Thus, the fear of work
disincentive effects defeated the FAP (Lynn,
1977:106-109; Ozawa, 1982:100-103).
In order to produce a politically
workable welfare reform proposal, the Program
for Better Jobs and Income (PBJI) proposed in
1977 by President Carter combined the
provision of income assistance with work
requirements. The major features of the PBJI
were 1) to create public service jobs, 2)
consolidate AFDC, SSI, and Food Stamp
programs to provide single cash payments, and
3) to supplement low earnings (Betson, et
al., 1980:166). However, despite its
emphasis on the work requirement, the PBJI
was not enacted due to congressional concern
with the budgetary costs.
Although unsuccessful, the above welfare
reform proposals were based on the belief
that the federal government's intervention
should be expanded to deal with social
problems. Contrary to the past
administrations, the Reagan administration
introduced the "New Federalism" in order to
minimize the federal government's involvement
in social policy. In Glazer's words, "the
originality of the administration lay in its
conviction that the way to wealth and
national income growth, and out of poverty
for the poor, could not be designed by
government, or implemented by programs keyed
to specific problems" (Glazer, 1984:97).
With this conviction, the
administration's plans for cutting federal
budgets targeted mainly entitlement programs.
By definition, the entitlement programs are
supposed to be "uncontrollable" because
everyone who is eligible for an entitlement
program has a "legally enforceable right to
the benefits" (Congressional Quarterly
Inc.(a), 1982:193). Nevertheless, the Reagan
administration managed to control the
entitlement programs by changing the laws
through the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1981 (OBRA). The federal government's ax
for cutting the budgets for social programs
fell most heavily on the entitlement programs
designed for thl poor who are politically the
least powerful.
The goals of the OBRA were to have more
AFDC recipient mothers work, promoting their
self-sufficiency and thereby serving the
truly needy only. However, from the
beginning, the OBRA's goal of promoting self-
sufficiency was hampered by its failure to
provide work incentives.4  It was apparent
that the ultimate goal of the OBRA was to
save AFDC costs by limiting the eligibility
and by reducing AFDC benefit levels. A
visible outcome of the OBRA changes was the
savings in AFDC costs, which were achieved at
the expense of AFDC recipient families that
lost eligibility or some benefits. The
worsened hardship of affected families was
reflected in the fact that they had to borrow
money or get food from charity organizations
frequently (Social Legislation Information
Service, 1984:130-131). Ironically, the
families affected by the OBRA changes became
economically worse-off as they increased work
efforts.
In summary, the past administrations'
attempts for welfare reform -- either
progressive or regressive -- have not
resulted in structural changes in the welfare
system, nor provided work incentives for
welfare recipients. To make things worse,
under the Reagan administration, the
direction for the advance of the welfare
system has been completely reversed. Through
the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, the most
recent changes made to the AFDC programs
intended to allevifte work disincentive
effects of the OBRA. However, the current
AFDC program remains essentially the same in
terms of its structural problems.
REVIVAL OF PROGRESSIVE WELFARE REFORM NEEDED
At the beginning of the Reagan
administration, Albrecht solemnly declared
that demands for (progressive) welfare reform
are futile because "welfare reform is dead
politically" (Albrecht, 1982:15). On the
contrary, despite the conservative tilt of
the country, Turem advocated for welfare
reform proposals out of his conviction that
"the time has come for a discussion of
program alternatives apart from ideology and
budget" (Turem, 1982:29). More recently,
however, regressive perspectives on welfare
reform became conspicuous as a result of
Charles Murray's (1984) well-publicized book,
"Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-
1980". Despite its methodological and
interpretational flaws8 , his book produced
bitterly regressive policy implications:
retrenchment or elimination of major welfare
programs. In attacking the ineffectiveness
of the current American welfare system in a
politically appealing manner, Charles Murray
has argued that the poor became worse-off as
a result of pro-poor programs. Although he
has made a flawed underestimation of the
effectiveness of anti-poverty programs, he
effectively described the difficulties in
curing poverty under the current welfare
system.
On the other hand, given the weaknesses
and the problems in the current welfare
system, a progressive formula for curing
poverty can be prescribed: advance and/or
expansion of the welfare system. For
example, the U.S. Catholic bishops call for
national economic planning for improving
distributional justice, income security, and
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employment opportunities for women and
minority. They claim that a substantial
reduction in poverty and inequality requires
fundamental changes in social and economic
structures. The bishops' specific
recommendations include "reforms in the tax
system" to reduce the burden on the poor as
well as "a thorough reform of the nation's
welfare and income-support programs" to
protect children and families (Ad Hoc
Committee in Catholic Social Teaching and the
U.S. Economy, 1985:11).
With the viewpoint that fundamental not
incremental changes are essential, a three-
dimensional agenda for welfare reform and its
rationales are discussed in this paper. The
author's advocacy for a reinforced investment
in the welfare system is based on the fact
that past anti-poverty programs have worked,
but not sufficiently nor perfectly. The
following policy proposals are based on three
principles: 1) all children have the inborn
right to be protected against material
deprivation, 2) all parents should meet their
parental responsibility to provide for their
dependent children, and 3) socioeconomic
disadvantages faced by single mothers
striving for economic independence need to be
reduced through targeted employment programs.
Dimension 1: Universal Assistance to
Families with Children
An overhaul of the income maintenance
system involves the incorporation of
universalism into the welfare system. The
principle of universalism is to provide non-
income-tested uniform benefits to certain
categories of persons identified only by
demographic characteristics like age.
Universal payments to custodial parents aim
to cover all children under a certain age, as
shown in the proposal of 1967 Family
Allowances Act. There are many rationales
for advocating the provision of children's
allowances:
* It should be noted that, in 1981, only
about 11 percent of all children received
some AFDC benefits, while about 20 percent of
all children lived in poverty (U.S. House of
Representatives, 1983:17-18). The current
AFDC program fails to save children from
poverty not only because of the program's
limited coverage, but also because of its
inadequate benefit levels.
' The current labor market structure
fails to compensate according to family
income needs, because wages are not based on
the family size, but on productivity. As
primary victims of this labor market
structure, children in large families ofte
face the great risk of living in poverty.0
Thus, children's allowances need to be
provided as a way of supplementing the
insufficient wages of parents.
Children's allowances will
redistribute income from childless families
to families with children and from better-off
to poorer families. In fact, the current
income maintenance system has benefited the
aged more than young children. The aged who
constitute about 20 percent of all households
receive over 50 percent of the total income
transferred through the income maintenance
system. On the other hand, the households
with children constituting about 40 percent
of all households receive only about 23
percent of all transferred incomes. Indeed,
the income maintenance system reflects the
"pro-aged tilt" (Danziger, 1981:4). The fact
that children are distinctly worse off than
adults can no longer be ignored.
: It is believed that to invest for
securing productive future generation through
children's allowances is in society's self-
interest (Segalman and Basu, 1981:202; Watts,
et al., 1982:407). Because the opportunities
for children of low income families to fully
develop potential abilities are limited by
the socioeconomic status of their parents, it
is necessary to provide socially-affordable
children's allowances to promote equal
opportunities for children.
It should not be overlooked that the
AFDC program has the divisiveness of income-
testing. To raise children under a
stigmatizing income support program is viewed
to be harmful to society's solidarity
(Titmuss, 1971:238; Rotherham, 1981:360;
Garfinkel, 1978:187-188).
* Under a universal provision of
children's allowances, the working poor will
not be penalized by implicit tax rates which
are much higher than explicit tax rates
levied on the non-poor.
• Children's allowances are advantageous
in maintaining a neutrality of public policy,
minimizing governmental influences or control
over individual family life by paying uniform
benefits.
Despite these various advantages,
welfare reform proposals based on
universalism have often been criticized under
the assumption that social welfare budgets
are fixed. Usually, the opposition to
universalistic approaches toward welfare
reform falls on the financial burden of
providing for all, including the non-poor.
It is criticized that advocating for a
guaranteed income has "an almost wistful,
childlike appeal -- the desire to be free
from the constraints of reality ..."
(Anderson, 1978:75). However, it should be
noted that, despite the growing federal
deficit, defense spending swelled from $136
billion in 1980 to $230 billion in 1984
(American Public Welfare Association,
1985:8). Thus, continued efforts should be
made to challenge the assumption of a fixed
budget available for social welfare programs.
To increase funds to meet the needs of
children and families should have a higher
priority in the decision-making process of
allocating federal budgets.
Dimension 2: Reinforced Support for
Children with Absent Parents
The goal of the Child Support
Enforcement Program initially enacted in 1975
is to collect child support payments from
absent parents in order to compensate for
AFDC costs. However, the child support
program has been ineffective to protect
children with absent parents in many aspects.
First, only about 60 percent of single
mothers whose children have an absent father
have legal child support agreements (Sorensen
and MacDonald, 1982:59). Also, less than a
half of all children awarded child support
receive the full amount due, and about 30
percent receive no payment at all (Garfinkel
and Uhr, 1984:114-115). Second, the amount of
collected child support is not adequate to
save all children with absent parents from
poverty. For instance, in 1978, 14 percent
of families that received the full amount of
court-ordered child support still lived in
poverty (Sorensen and MacDonald, 1982:65).
In addition, there exists inequity in the
current system because the amounts of child
support awarded vary according to the
attitudes of the professionals involved in
the court decision (Garfinkel and Uhr,
1984:115).
Recent policy proposals for correcting
these problems center around a social child
support system which resembles the Swedish
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social Child Support system providing for
children with absent parents (Oellerich and
Garfinkel, 1983; Danziger et al., 1979;
smeeding and Garfinkel, 1980; Garfinkel and
Uhr, 1984; Garfinkel, 1982; Garfinkel and
Sorensen, 1982). The contents of the social
child support system as elucidated by its
advocates are as follows:
* It assures that all absent parents pay
child support taxes to share income with
their children. All absent parents should
pay an equitable proportion of income varying
only by the number of children to be
:supported. In this way, the parents'
:responsibility for supporting their children
will be sustained no matter how the family
structure changes.
An adequate amount of child support
should be guaranteed in order to protect all
children with absent parents. If absent
parents fail to pay, at least, the minimally
guaranteed amount of child support, the
government should supplement inadequate child
support from the general revenues. Thus, the
basic income need of all children will be met
even if their absent parents earn a low
income, are unemployed, or are sick.
The AFDC program will be eliminated,
thus saving its costs. Since the social
child support system will not involve income-
testing, it will be administered more
efficiently than the AFDC program, reducing
stigma effects on the beneficiaries.
* Collecting child support from absent
fathers should be carried out effectively
through an income withholding system.
Employers should be required to withhold a
portion of the income of employees liable for
child support taxes.
* Most of all, since the amount of child
support is not based on the income of
custodial parents, work disincentive effects
will not be created by the child support
system. The custodial parents will not be
subject to higher tax rates in relation to
the receipt of social child support, as AFDC
recipient parents have been.
Overall, the social child support system
is believed to be an efficient policy
instrument for reducing the income inequality
between female-headed families and two-parent
families. Also, the idea of the social child
support system appears to be particularly
promising in terms of s political
feasibility and effectiveness.
Dimension 3: Targeted Employment
Programs for Single Mothers
It has often been maintained that
welfare problems must be solved in the
context of the labor market problems because
poverty and welfare dependence are largely
the results of the inadequate structure of
the labor market (Gordon, 1972:7; Glazer,
1975; Saks, 1975:103; Galper, 1975:29). The
labor market-focused approach for welfare
reform relates to both micro and macro
economic policies. Microeconomic policies to
reduce the income gap between the rich and
the poor attempt to raise the earnings of the
poor by intervening in both the supply side
and the demand-side of the labor market
through training, public employment, and wage
subsidy programs. Macroeconomic policies
toward full employment are also helpful in
reducing the income gap (Cain, 1984:30-31).
From the viewpoint that the
intervention in the labor market should be an
important agenda for welfare reform, many
consider targeted employment programs to be
particularly advantageous for welfare
recipients to increase incomes by combining
earnings and welfare benefits (Danziger and
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Lampman, 1983:69; Plotnick and Smeeding,
1979:268-269; Danziger et al., 1979:34). The
primary rationale for providing employment
programs specifically designed for single
mothers lies in the fact that single mothers
are the most disadvantaged workers. Single
mothers generally earn low wages compared
with male/father providers, in large part,
due to sex discrimination and/or occupational
segregation in the labor market (Watts, et
al., 1982:407-408).
Because the employability of mothers
with children is associated with diverse
factors such as work experience, educational
background, job skills, demand for labor,
child care task, and so on, employment
programs for single mothers should provide
multi-faceted services. In the past,
comprehensive employment programs such as the
Work Incentive (WIN) program aimed to improve
the employability of welfare recipient
mothers by providing training, child care,
and other services. However, the Reagan
administration has shifted from the work
incentive approach to the mandatory work
requirement approach out of "ideological and
fiscal concerns" (Kuttner and Freeman,
1982:18). Since mandatory workfare programs
such as Community Work Experience programs
cannot lead the participants to better jobs,
the current policy should be replaced with a
more progressive employment policy aimed at
leading low income women to better jobs by
improving job skills.
In addition to training/education
services, it is particularly important to
provide employer subsidies for single
mothers. For example, the current Targeted
Jobs Credit Program should be made more
effective in terms of encoufiging employers
to hire low income mothers. At the same
time, the child care constraint cannot be
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ignored in helping mothers transfer from
welfare to stable employment.
To summarize, to reduce the earning gap
between female heads and male heads is the
ultimate goal of targeted employment programs
for single mothers. Targeted employment
programs for single mothers should deal with
both the supply side and the demand side
through training/education and employment
subsidies. In particular, child care
constraints need to be removed through direct
child care subsidies. The danger of
providing insufficiently-funded employment
programs, as has been the case under the
Reagan administration, leads single mothers,
at best, to dead-end jobs, confining them in
prolonged poverty and dependence on public
assistance. Thus, it cannot be
overemphasized that future employment-
oriented programs should be sufficiently
funded to provide quality services.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, three policy goals have
been advocated: basic guaranteed income for
all children, reinforcement of child support
for children with absent parents, and
improvement of employment opportunities for
disadvantaged women. It should be noted
that both children's allowances and minimum
guarantees for children with absent parents
resolve the problem of work disincentive
effects on custodial parents. At the same
time, when children have access to a
universal grant as a right and absent fathers
meet their parental duties, single mothers
with young children will be less frequently
forced to sacrifice child care duties for
economic reasons. Mothers should be allowed
to make the optimal choice between home and
work so that their children's need for
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maternal care will not be neglected. For
this purpose, the above three-dimensional
policy proposal needs to be implemented
concurrently to make a substantial
improvement in both the material and non-
material well-being of children and their
families.
While the provision of employment-
oriented programs for disadvantaged
individuals has been diminishingly funded in
the past, the proposals for providing a
guaranteed income for children have hardly
been implemented mainly due to budgetary
concerns. Although financial constraints are
not likely to be easily overcome in the near
future, it cannot be overemphasized that
future approaches toward welfare reform
should be integrated with the long-term
movement toward the welfare state. In the
absence of a tradition of social solidarity,
advance toward the welfare state is likely to
be a painfully slow process. Nevertheless,
it is time to resurrect the ideas for
progressive welfare reform.
Notes
1. For example, in 1983, about 46
percent of female-headed families with
children in school received school lunch
benefits (U.S. Department of Commerce (d),
1985:2).
2. The sheer complexity of the current
welfare system was effectively documented by
Tom Joe and Lorna Potter who examined income-
testing procedures for a typical AFDC working
mother for a 4-year period. Describing
administrative complexity, the authors
evaluated that the 1981 policy changes
further complicated an already complex
welfare system (Joe and Potter, 1985:12).
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3. According to a 1983 Brookings study,
the reductions achieved by the OBRA, imposed
on the budget of 1982, was $27.1 billion,
while Ellwood reported an estimated cut of
$35.2 billion in outlays (as quoted in
Glazer, 1984:79). The budget reductions were
made disproportionately in income maintenance
programs, with heavier cuts in public
assistance. According to an estimate of
outlays savings in 1984 arising from the 1981
OBRA, almost 60 percent of reductions occured
in pro-poor programs, while these account for
only 18 percent of income maintenance
outlays. The expected savings as a
percentage of baseline amount for each
program is 1.6 percent for OASDI, 16.3
percent for AFDC, 18.6 percent for Food
Stamps, and 34.5 percent for low income
energy assistance (as quoted in Glazer,
1984:96).
4. Initial studies of the effects of
the 1981 policy changes failed to provide
empirical evidence that the OBRA changes
caused a reduction in the labor supply of
working AFDC recipients (Moffitt, 1984:29;
Smolensky, 1985:10). However, an updated
study showed that a significant decrease in
work efforts was found among AFDC recipients
when the unemployment rate was taken into
account (as reported in "Focus" by Institute
for Research on Poverty, Fall/Winter
1985:22).
5. The major changes in the AFDC
program brought by the OBRA included: 1)
establishing a cap on eligibility at 150
percent of the state need standard; 2) new
assets eligibility limit; 3) elimination of
$30-and-one-third deductions after four
months; 4) reduction in the amount of the
$30-and-one-third deductions during the first
four months; 5) standardizing work-related
expenses at $75 per month and capping child
care expenses at $160 per child; 6) deeming
step-parent income available to the children;
and 7) automatically counting in advance the
Earned Income Tax Credit (Moffitt, 1984:3;
The Center for the Study of Social Policy,
1984:19-20).
6. The savings in AFDC costs achieved
in the year following the OBRA enactment
amounted to $93 million per month (Institute
for Research on Poverty, 1985:4). The fiscal
1983 budget proposal also estimated that a
combined total savings in AFDC costs would
amount to $5.9 billion by fiscal 1987
(Congressional Quarterly Inc. (b), 1982:240-
241). The number of AFDC recipient families
that were affected by the OBRA changes were
710,000; about 408,000 families lost
eligibility and 299,000 lost some benefits
nationwide. The average monthly income of
families who lost AFDC benefits due to the
OBRA changes was lower than the 1983 poverty
level for between 28 to 86 percent of the
families, depending on the areas of residence
(Institute for Research on Poverty, 1985:2-
7).
7. The changes to the AFDC program
brought by the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984
include: 1) raising the AFDC gross-income
limit from 150 percent of a state's need
standard to 185 percent of a state's need
standard; 2) extending the disregard of the
first $30 of an AFDC recipients' earnings
from the first 4 months to the first 12
months on a job. The disregard of a third of
the remaining earnings is still limited to 4
months; and 3) raising the AFDC work-expense
deduction for part-time workers to the $75
level for full-time workers, and so on
(General Accounting Office, 1985:13-14).
8. Researchers at the Institute for
Research on Poverty provided a sound critique
of Charles Murray's book. For details, see
McLanahan, Sara et al., Losing Ground: a
Critique. Institute for Research on Poverty,
Special report No. 38, August 1985.
9. The family size is closely
associated with the poverty rate. For
example, in 1978, nearly 40 percent of
families with 5 or more children were poor,
while less than 5 percent of families with no
-children lived in poverty (Levitan,
1980:10).
10. It is expected that a social child
support demonstration project which is under
way in Wisconsin will provide sound evidence
that the new system indeed reduces both
poverty and public dependence among female-
headed families. Several counties are
currently using wage withholding for
financing child support. According to
current plans, as of January 1986, a minimum
benefit will also be provided in several
counties (Garfinkel and Uhr, 1984:122).
11. Under the current Targeted Jobs
Credit program, employers hiring economically
disadvantaged, handicapped or welfare
recipient persons can receive a credit of 50
percent of the first $6,000 of wages only in
the first year of employment. However, the
credit reduces to 25 percent in the second
year, curtailing its effectiveness (Social
Legislation Information Service, 1984).
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